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I. Introduction 
 
It has been more than two decades since the D.C. Historic Preservation Act (the “Act”) 1 
was passed.  Hailed as one of the most comprehensive historic preservation statutes in the 
nation, 2 the Act provides a multi- layered scheme that regulates the conditions under which 
permits for demolition, 3 alteration, 4 subdivision, 5 or new construction6 within an historic district 
or at the site of an historic landmark may be granted.  Under the Act, only the Mayor of the 
District of Columbia (or his Agent) may issue a permit to demolish7 an historic landmark or 
structure within an historic district, and only where he has determined that the issuance of the 
demolition permit is “necessary in the public interest,” or where failure to issue a permit would 
result in “unreasonable economic hardship”8 to the owner of the historic property. 9, 10    
                                                 
1 Act of Nov. 28, 1978, D.C. Pub. L. 2-144 (codified at D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1101 et seq.).   
2 See Benjamin Forgey, Preservation Perseverance: 25 Years After the National Act, Standing Up for What’s Still Standing, 
WASH . POST, May 11, 1991, at C1; David S. Hilzenrath, Mixing the Old With the New: Debate Rages Over Preserving Old 
Buildings as Facades , WASH . POST, Aug. 13, 1988, at E1. 
3 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1104. 
4 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1105. 
5 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1106. 
6 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1107. 
7 Due to space limitations, the Act’s provisions concerning demolition—the most permanent and irreversible form of structural 
alteration—will be discussed in order to afford the reader a sense of the general structure and operation of the Act.  Differences 
between the statute’s demolition provisions and the provisions concerning alteration, subdivision and new construction permits 
will be discussed briefly in the footnotes.  In addition, for reference purposes, an outline describing the structure of the Act is 
attached as Appendix 1.   
8 A full discussion of what constitutes “unreasonable economic hardship” is beyond the scope of this article.  Briefly, the Act 
defines “unreasonable economic hardship” to include situations where: (1) failure to issue a permit would amount to a “taking of 
the owner’s property without just compensation”; or, in the case of a low income owner (as determined by the Mayor), (2) failure 
to issue a permit would place an “onerous and excessive financial burden upon such owner(s)”.  See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 6-
1102(14). 
9 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1104(e).  The same standards are in place for alteration and subdivision permit applications.  See D.C. 
Code Ann. § 6-1105(f) & § 6-1106(e).  However, in the case of new construction permit applications, a different standard is 
applied.  Specifically, new construction permits “shall be issued unless the Mayor, after due consideration of the zoning laws and 
regulations of the District of Columbia, finds that the design of the building and the character of the historic district or historic 
landmark are incompatible…”  (emphasis added).  See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1107(f). 
10 The Mayor (or his Agent) also is required by the Act to conform to certain procedural requirements prior to the issuance of a 
demolition permit.  These include:  
(1) referral of the permit application to the D.C. Historic Preservation Review Board (the “Review Board”) or the 
Commission of Fine Arts under the Old Georgetown Act.  See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1201 et seq.  Such referral is mandatory for 
demolitions, alterations, subdivisions, and new construction permits.  See D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-1104—6-1107;  
(2) consideration of any recommendation issued by the Review Board or Commission of Fine Arts pursuant to the 
Mayor’s referral.  Consideration of the Review Board’s or Commission’s recommendation is mandatory for demolitions, 
alterations, and new construction permits, but is discretionary for subdivision permits; and 
(3) conducting a public hearing concerning the permit application within 120 days after the Review Board receives the 
Mayor’s referral.  Public hearings are not required in demolition permit application cases if “the Review Board has advised in its 
recommendation that the building or structure does not contribute to the historic district or the historic landmark.”  D.C. Code 
Ann. § 6-1104(c).  A similar provision regarding subdivisions is provided in the Act.  See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1106(c).  
However, no hearing is required for alteration or new construction permit applications.  See D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-1105(c), 6-
1107(c). 
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“Necessary in the public interest” is defined by the Act as a project that is: (1) “consis tent 
with the purposes of this subchapter as set forth in § 6-1101(b)”;11 or (2) “necessary to allow the 
construction of a project of special merit.”12   
The latter of the two “necessary in the public interest” prongs is striking.  The concept—a 
special merit exemption from the rigorous requirements of an historic preservation act—is more 
or less unique to the District of Columbia.  The author is aware of only one other jurisdiction—
San Antonio—that appears to have anything like it, and the San Antonio statute is based largely 
upon D.C.’s law. 13  
“Special merit” is defined by the Act to mean: “a plan or building having significant 
benefits to the District of Columbia or to the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, 
specific features of land planning, or social or other benefits having a high priority for 
community services.”14  But the Act’s definitions stop here, leaving the meaning of “exemplary 
architecture,” “specific features of land planning,” and “social or other benefits having a high 
priority for community services” to the Mayor (or the courts) to articulate. 
The legislative history accompanying the Act does not offer much guidance to the future 
interpreters of special merit.  Its discussion of the provision is confined largely to one sentence: 
“Factors which are common to all projects are not considered as special merit.”15  The few other 
instances in which the legislative history mentions “special merit” are opaque.  For example, the 
                                                 
11 D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1101(b) declares the purposes of the subchapter to be: 
“(1)  With respect to properties in historic districts: 
        (A)  To retain and enhance those properties which contribute to the character of the historic district and to encourage their 
adaptation for current use; 
        (B)  To assure that alterations of existing structures are compatible with the character of the historic district; and 
        (C)  To assure that new construction and subdivision of lots in an historic district are compatible with the character of the 
historic district; 
 (2)  With respect to historic landmarks: 
        (A)  To retain and enhance historic landmarks in the District of Columbia and to encourage their adaptation for current use; 
and 
        (B)  To encourage the restoration of historic landmarks.”   
12 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1102(10). 
13 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, §§ 35-7002, 35-7051. 
14 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1102(11). 
15 NADINE P. WINTER, CHAIR OF THE D.C. COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON BILL 2-367, “THE 
HISTORIC LANDMARK AND HISTORIC DISTRICT PROTECTION ACT OF 1978,” 6 (Oct. 5, 1978). 
 4 
legislative history provides that the “basic principle of [the demolitions section] is that, except in 
special circumstances, demolition of buildings covered by the Act will be allowed only where 
required by the Constitution or where an historic district would not be adversely affected,” 
(emphasis added).16  Although oral history of the legislation suggests a narrow view of special 
merit,17 such interpretation was not incorporated in the final language of the statute nor its 
written legislative history.  Whether intentional or not, this lack of written guidance on the 
provision’s intent gives the Mayor (and the courts) considerable discretion in deciding the 
parameters of special merit. 
And what of this discretion?  In applying the Act over the past two decades, has the 
Mayor (or the courts) offered any concrete guidance as to what a project of “special merit” 
should contemplate?  What sorts of projects have been approved over the years as ones of 
“special merit”?  Which have not?  Must a project be both “necessary” as well as a “project of 
special merit”?  What is the rela tionship between projects that are “consistent with the purposes 
of the Act” versus those projects deemed to be ones of “special merit”?   
This article seeks to answer these and other questions through a review of published 
decisions of the Mayor’s Agent concerning permit applications in which the applicant asserted 
“special merit” as a ground for granting the application.  Four of these Mayor’s Agent decisions 
were appealed directly to the D.C. Court of Appeals and resulted in significant guidance for 
those interested in pursuing or opposing permit applications raising issues of special merit.18  
Because these cases offer controlling authority on the parameters of special merit, as well as 
                                                 
16 See id. at 10.  
17 According to the Act’s primary draftsman, David Bonderman, the special merit provision was inserted at the insistence of 
Mayor Walter Washington, to provide an “out” in extreme cases where, say, a hospital or power plant just had to be built upon 
the site of an historic landmark or on a specific plot of land within an historic district.  See Jeremy Dutra, You Can’t Tear It 
Down: The Origins of the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, 26-27 (May 14, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, copy available from 
the author). 
18 These appellate-level court cases addressing special merit are: (1) Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of 
Hous. & Community Dev., 428 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981); (2) Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of 
Columbia Dep’t of Hous., 432 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981); (3) Committee of 100 on the Federal City v. District of Columbia Dep’t of 
Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 571 A.2d 195 (D.C. 1990); and, (4) Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia 
Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 655 A.2d 865 (D.C. 1995). 
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greatly enhance understanding of the Act, they will be discussed in detail here, and will provide 
the framework through which the Mayor’s Agent decisions will be analyzed.   
 6 
II. D.C. Court of Appeals Cases Addressing Special Merit 
 
 Recall that the Act provides that no demolition permit shall issue unless such permit is 
“necessary in the public interest,” which is defined to mean either: (1) consistent with the 
purposes of the Act; or (2) necessary to allow the construction of a project of special merit 
(emphasis added).  The first special merit case considered by the D.C. Court of Appeals (decided 
in March 1981, just a few years after the Act was passed) contains comprehensive guidance on 
whether “necessary” is a separate inquiry in special merit cases (e.g., whether a project must be 
both “necessary” and “a project of special merit” in order to satisfy the Act’s strictures).  In 
Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Housing & Community 
Development,19 citizens’ groups Don’t Tear It Down20 and the Georgetown Citizens’ Association 
sought review of an order of the Mayor’s Agent authorizing a permit to demolish several 
buildings located on certain real property located in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. 
owned by the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO).   
 At issue were two nineteenth century buildings owned by PEPCO, which constituted part 
of PEPCO’s Georgetown Substation facility:  (1) the Conduit Shop (built in 1888, originally 
used as an architectural iron works shop, later as a repair shop, and, since 1979, vacant); and (2) 
the North Building (built in 1899, originally designed for power production, and, at the time of 
the case, used to house part of the substation facility).21  PEPCO sought a permit to demolish 
both the Conduit Shop and the North Building in order to construct a new “more safe and 
efficient” substation.  The demolition permit application also included a proposal to preserve the 
two main façades of the Conduit Shop.22  
                                                 
19 Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous. & Community Development, 428 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981). 
20 Don’t Tear It Down was a citizens’ group founded in 1971 to “stop the destruction of many of the city’s major historic 
buildings.”  It is the predecessor to the D.C. Preservation League, a nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving, protecting, 
and enhancing the “historic built environment” of Washington, D.C. through advocacy and education.  See 
http://www.dcpreservation.org. 
21 See Don’t Tear It Down, 428 A.2d at 371.   
22 See id. at 372. 
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 All parties in this case had agreed that a new substation was needed at this location, and 
that the substation facility was a project of special merit because “the ability to provide electrical 
service has a ‘high priority for community service’”. 23  However, the parties disagreed as to 
whether the proposed demolition was necessary to construct the new substation.  On the issue of 
necessity, PEPCO presented evidence that it had conducted an engineering study that examined 
eight plans concerning the construction of a replacement facility, resulting in the emergence of 
five alternative options for the site.24  These alternatives included: (1) doing nothing; (2) 
transferring the power load to adjacent substations; (3) replacing equipment within the existing 
facility; (4) constructing a new facility in the Georgetown area on a different site; and (5) 
building a new facility on the present site, which would involve demolition of at least the 
Conduit Shop.25  PEPCO studied these alternatives for a number of years, ultimately rejecting 
each proposal, except for the option involving demolition.  The other proposals were rejected for 
a variety of reasons, mostly related to cost, zoning and structural problems.26   
 Parties opposed to demolition of the PEPCO-owned structures offered the testimony of 
an expert in electrical substation design.  This expert provided a substation concept drawing that 
basically was identical to the substation proposed by PEPCO, but built in a slightly different 
physical location on the Georgetown site, thus allowing the Conduit Shop to be salvaged.27   The 
expert’s concept drawing had not been presented to a structural engineer or architect, and it did 
not expressly consider cost or compliance with the District of Columbia Building Code.  
Nonetheless, the expert estimated that his plan would cost, at a minimum, ten to fifteen percent 
more than the demolition option proposed by PEPCO.28 
                                                 
23 See id. at 373, 376.   
24 See id. at 373-376.   
25 See id. at 374.   
26 See id. at 375-376.   
27 See id. at 376.   
28 See id. 
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 The court described the findings of the Mayor’s Agent, who had concluded that, although 
“alternative conceptual proposals were presented,” it was unproven that such proposals could be 
“seriously considered and executed” due to certain “obstacles” such as cost and infeasibility. 29   
In light PEPCO’s “detailed examination” of options for the site, an examination that spanned 
several years, the Mayor’s Agent found that the demolition proposal was “necessary” to 
construct a project of special merit. 
Petitioners (opponents of the demolition) challenged this Mayor’s Agent decision, 
arguing that factors such as cost, delay and technical infeasibility have no role to play in a 
standard to determine whether a special merit project is “necessary.”  However, the court found 
that such factors are properly considered in the special merit analysis.30  The court stated that 
although petitioners submitted evidence that an alternative to demolition might exist, they did not 
submit evidence that their proposal was a reasonable alternative.  Reasoning that “the applicant 
is not charged with considering every option that any party in opposition might conceptualize to 
avoid demolition,” the court held that “all reasonable alternatives must be considered” (emphasis 
added).31  The court continued: 
“Reasonableness must be imputed into the ‘necessary’ standard, and at a 
hearing on each ‘special merit’ permit, factors including but not limited to cost, 
delay, and technical feasibility become proper considerations for determining 
‘necessary’… Each of these factors has bearing on whether there are viable 
alternatives to demolition available, and the answer to this question determines 
necessity.”32 
 
 
Applying this “necessary and reasonable” standard, the court upheld the Mayor’s Agent 
decision with respect to demolition of the Conduit Shop, but remanded the case to the Mayor’s 
agent for a specific determination as to whether the North Building was also “necessary” to be 
demolished to support the construction of the new substation.  
                                                 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 379. 
31 Id. 
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 This imposition of a “reasonableness” test to determine whether a project was 
“necessary” for a project of special merit also was embraced in the next special merit case 
considered by the D.C. Court of Appeals. 
 In Citizens Committee to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of Columbia 
Department of Housing,33 a citizens’ group challenged a decision of the Mayor’s Agent 
permitting the demolition of three structures designated as landmarks in the D.C. Inventory of 
Historic Sites—the Keith’s Theater and Albee Building (“Keith-Albee”), the National 
Metropolitan Bank Building (“Bank”), and the remains of the Rhodes Tavern, which had been 
partially destroyed in 1957.  These structures sat together in a row on 15th Street, with Rhodes 
Tavern situated on the northeast corner of 15th and F Streets, N.W.  Each structure faced the U.S. 
Treasury Building, a national landmark.34  The permit applicant desired to build an office and 
retail stores complex on a block bounded by 14th, 15th, F and G Streets, and the three historic 
structures presented a “substantial obstacle.”35  Prior to seeking the demolition permit, the 
applicants prepared a comprehensive study of their proposed office/retail complex, using an 
architectural firm to assess their options.  The architectural firm proposed nine alternatives, and 
preliminary cost analyses resulted in more serious consideration of four options:  (1) retention of 
the Rhodes Tavern and the façades of the Keith-Albee and Bank Buildings; (2) retention of the 
façades of the Keith-Albee and Bank Buildings; (3) retention only of the Rhodes Tavern; and (4) 
total demolition of the three structures to allow for new construction.  A negotiation process 
initiated by the applicant, involving preservation groups and the District of Columbia 
government, resulted in the proposal before the court, which included demolition of the remains 
of the Rhodes Tavern, while retaining the façades of the Keith-Albee and Bank Buildings.  The 
court stated that this proposal emerged because of the negotiation group’s collective recognition 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 See id. at 380. 
33 Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous., 432 A.2d 710 (D.C. 1981), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).  
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that funds were not available to retain all three structures, and that a “higher priority” should be 
placed on retention of the Keith-Albee and Bank façades due to “their scale and design in 
relation to the Treasury building.”36   
The court addressed whether the project, as ultimately proposed, was “necessary” in the 
second half of its opinion. 37  Citing Don’t Tear It Down, the court rejected the petitioner’s 
argument that in order to find demolition “necessary,” the Mayor’s Agent must conclude that 
there is no feasible alternative way to complete the project.38  The court emphasized that the 
“necessary” standard only requires applicants to consider reasonable alternatives, and that it was 
“entirely proper” to consider evidence concerning the cost of preserving the structures, including 
the Rhodes Tavern, to evaluate whether viable alternatives existed.39  The court suggested that 
developers should not be forced to bear the costs of preserving historic landmarks alone, and 
found that the applicants had made “persistent efforts” to secure funding to retain all three 
structures.  In light of these efforts and the alternatives which were considered, the court found 
substantial evidence supporting a rational finding that the proposed demolition of the Rhodes 
Tavern was “necessary.”40      
 Going beyond simply following Don’t Tear It Down on the “necessary” standard, 
however, this case broke new ground on the issue of whether the Act requires a balancing test 
between the historical values to be lost by the demolition against the special merit of the 
proposed project.41  The parties disagreed as to the statutory standard for special merit cases.  
The petitioners argued that the statute “compels” a balancing test, while the developers 
contended that the statute only requires a finding that the project is one of special merit, “with 
                                                                                                                                                             
34 See Rhodes Tavern, 432 A.2d at 713-714. 
35 See id. at 713. 
36 See id. at 714. 
37 See id. at 717 et seq.   
38 See id. at 717-718.   
39 See id. at 718.   
40 See id. 
41 See Rhodes Tavern 432 A.2d at 715-716.   
 11 
the concomitant finding of necessity to issue a demolition permit in order to allow the project to 
go forward.”42  The court held that while the statute: 
“focuses on a finding of ‘special merit’ as the critical factor in permitting 
demolition of a historic landmark to allow for new construction, by its very nature 
it also requires more.  With its emphasis on ‘safeguard[ing] the city’s historic, 
aesthetic and cultural heritage, as embodied and reflected in [its] landmarks and 
districts,’ [citing the Act] the Act implicitly requires that, in the case of 
demolition, the Mayor’s Agent balance the historical value of the particular 
landmark against the special merit of the proposed project.”43   
 
The court then examined the Mayor’s Agent’s conclusions, and found that they contained 
substantial evidence that the architectural and historical values of Rhodes Tavern were 
considered and were balanced properly against the “special merit” proposed by the office and 
retail project.  The court noted that the Agent’s decision discussed the historical and architectural 
significance of Rhodes Tavern, incorporated by reference several reports discussing such matters 
in detail,44 and that the Mayor’s Agent heard extensive testimony on the historical nature of 
Rhodes Tavern during the course of the three-day public hearing concerning the demolition 
permit, including some testimony which “cast doubt on whether certain events purported to have 
taken place [at Rhodes Tavern] actually did.”45  The court faulted the Mayor’s Agent for not 
stating with utmost precision which of these historical values were outweighed by the project’s 
special merits, but was satisfied nonetheless these factors were balanced against the Agent’s 
finding of special merit, which was premised upon “exemplary architecture… ‘because of the 
sensitive incorporation of the façades…[which] offer particular reinforcement to the 
monumentality and powerful rhythm of the colonnaded east side of the U.S. Treasury 
Building’…”46 
                                                 
42 See id. at 715. 
43 See id. 
44 Notably, an October 18, 1979 Report prepared by the Joint Committee on Landmarks, and documents in support of the 
nomination of Rhodes Tavern to the National Register of Historic Places.  See Rhodes Tavern 432 A.2d at 716-717.  
45 See id. 
46 See id. at 715 (citing the Mayor’s Agent decision). 
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Note that the court also opined that the record contained evidence that it believed might 
support a finding of special merit on other grounds.  As examples, the court mentioned that the 
District of Columbia stood to gain over $2 million in tax revenue and over 2,000 permanent jobs 
from the proposed development.47   
The balancing test, which the Rhodes Tavern court declared the Act to implicitly require, 
thus undertaken, combined with the finding of “necessity” for the project, was enough for the 
court to uphold the project’s status as one of special merit.48  Interestingly, the court did not 
address explicitly whether a special merit project first must be deemed “necessary” prior to 
engaging in the requisite balancing test.  However, it did imply, based simply on the organization 
of its own opinion (which discussed the necessity of the balancing test before it addressed the 
issue of whether the project as a whole was necessary), that so long as the Mayor’s Agent 
employed both tests and reached rational conclusions, a special merit challenge would survive 
appellate scrutiny.   
 Having spoken through Don’t Tear It Down and Rhodes Tavern, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals had established two legal foundations for the special merit exemption.  To determine 
whether a project would meet the test of “special merit,” it was clear by the end of 1981 that: (1) 
demolition of the historic structure must be established as “necessary” based upon consideration 
of all reasonable alternatives to the demolition; and (2) a balancing test must be employed to 
determine whether the “special merit” of the proposed project outweighed the loss of the 
historical structure.   
 Almost a decade passed before the D.C. Court of Appeals heard another special merit 
case.  In Committee of 100 on the Federal City v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer 
                                                 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 720. 
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& Regulatory Affairs,49 preservationists appealed a decision of the Mayor’s Agent permitting the 
demolition of a structure listed in the D.C. Inventory of Historic Sites.  However, unlike the two 
earlier special merit cases, here the court held that the Mayor’s Agent decision was not 
reasonable in light of the applicable legal standards for special merit cases. 
 The applicant, S.J.G. Properties, Inc. (“S.J.G.”), wished to demolish the Woodward 
Building, located in the District’s Fifteenth Street Financial Historic District, in order to 
construct a mixed-use office building.  The proposal also provided that the top two of the 
proposed twelve floors would be dedicated to residential housing, supplemented by a day care 
center “for at least 57 persons.”50  The Mayor’s Agent had concluded that the project was one of 
special merit because of the housing and day care, which was found to constitute “social or other 
benefits having a high priority for community service[s].”51 
 The court held that the Mayor’s Agent’s finding that the services proposed by S.J.G. were 
of special merit was not supported by substantial evidence, noting that the “housing and day care 
components of S.J.G.’s proposal appear only in a very general outline…”52  It troubled the court 
that the Mayor’s Agent relied upon general goals of the City to justify her finding of special 
merit, but that these goals were not tied to the specific location of the proposed project.53  For 
example, the Mayor’s Agent cited portions of the D.C. Comprehensive Plan that called for a 
“critical mass” of housing in the downtown area as justification for finding the project one of 
“special merit.”54  The court pointed out that the cited section of the Comprehensive Plan was 
taken out of context, and that what the Plan actually called for was a “critical mass of key land 
uses,” including housing, in specified areas of downtown (the Financial District, where the 
                                                 
49 Committee of 100 on the Fed. City v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 571 A.2d 195 (D.C. 
1990). 
50 See Committee of 100, 571 A.2d at 197-198.  
51 See id. at 200. 
52 See Committee of 100, 571 A.2d at 201. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 201-202.   
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project was to be constructed, was not so specified).55  Finally, the court criticized the Mayor’s 
Agent for concluding that the parking added by this project was “special,” noting that since 
“parking must be considered with every downtown project…it does not ordinarily qualify as an 
amenity of ‘special merit’”. 56    
After debunking the grounds upon which the Mayor’s Agent had rested her finding of 
“special merit”, the court addressed the Agent’s finding that renovation of the Woodward 
building was not “economically feasible.”57  Here the court seems to dance awkwardly around 
the issue of whether the Mayor’s Agent properly found the demolition of the Woodward 
Building to be “necessary”.  But rather than neatly trace the lines drawn previously by Don’t 
Tear It Down and Rhodes Tavern, which could have resulted in a tight conclusion that all 
reasonable alternatives to the demolition were not considered by the applicants, the court seems 
to get hung up on the semantics used by (and the testimony highlighted by) the Mayor’s Agent, 
as well as the language chosen by the parties in their briefs.58   The result, whether the court 
meant to or not, leaves the meaning of whether a special merit project is “necessary” under the 
Act, and what factors should determine “necessity,” subject to new interpretation.  
The court’s analysis begins with a statement that “economic feasibility is just one factor 
to be considered in determining whether to allow demolition,” and is followed by a discussion of 
the Mayor’s Agent’s findings that a renovated Woodward Building would generate a below 
average rate of return for downtown commercial income-producing properties.59  After reciting 
additional findings of the Mayor’s Agent that, “the issue is not whether a renovation can be done, 
but whether [the project] can command the level of rents necessary to justify the extraordinary 
expense of renovation”60 (emphasis added), the court proudly states: 
                                                 
55 See id. at 202. 
56 See id. at 201. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 202-203. 
59 See id. at 202. 
60 Id. at 203. 
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“The issue is not whether [the project] can command the level of rents 
necessary to justify the expense of renovation, but whether demolition of the 
Woodward Building and the historic values statutorily ascribed to buildings 
located within historic districts is justified by the cost of renovation and by the 
benefits which the new building would bring to the community.”61 
 
Following this bold declaration, the court concludes its analysis of “economic feasibility” 
with this offering:  “Moreover…the balancing of the historic value of the Woodward Building 
against the special merits of the project could not proceed until the Mayor’s Agent found that the 
amenities proposed by S.J.G. were sufficient to constitute a project of special merit.”62 
The words of the court tend to support to the hypothesis that, after Committee of 100, an 
examination of “reasonable alternatives” no longer satisfies the necessary test, because the court 
appears to have blended the “necessary” test with the “balancing test” held to be required under 
Rhodes Tavern.  Indeed, the court’s only discussion of “alternatives” that might have been 
considered by the applicants was inextricably linked to the worth of S.J.G.’s special merit 
argument—the court expressed its concerns that the Mayor’s Agent did not respond to objections 
made at the hearing that the “special” amenities of this project (housing and day care) could be 
provided in a renovated Woodward Building.63   
The Committee of 100 holding also adds a procedural step to its “blended” balancing test 
analysis.  This court would only require a balancing/necessary test if the project is first deemed 
to be one of special merit.64  
 With the addition of the Committee of 100 court opinion on special merit, the law was at 
a malleable stage.  The case law suggested that special merit decisions must be grounded in some 
sort of balancing test, weighing the benefits of what was to be gained from the proposed project 
against what would be lost by virtue of the demolition, and it was suggested that such balancing 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. at 201. 
64 See id. at 203. 
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only needed to be engaged after it was determined that a project constituted one of special merit.  
And while the case law also acknowledged that the demolition must be proven “necessary,” the 
law was split as to how this determination was to be made.  The earlier cases (Don’t Tear It 
Down and Rhodes Tavern) would require the submission of reasonable alternatives in order to 
meet the “necessary” test, which was envisioned as a separate and distinct inquiry from the 
balancing test.  However, more recent case law (Committee of 100) suggested a combination 
approach, confident that a project’s “necessity” would be revealed by engaging in the balancing 
test, and that neither a separate inquiry nor formally proposed alternatives to demolition were 
required.  
 The next (and final) D.C. Court of Appeals case to consider seriously the issue of special 
merit was an appeal of the Mayor’s Agent’s denial of a demolition application under the Act.  
The 1995 case of Kalorama Heights Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia Department of 
Consumer & Regulatory Affairs65 dealt with the Moses House, which had served as the French 
Embassy from the 1940s until 1984, but had been vacant since 1984 and was physically 
deteriorated.66  The Moses House was designated as a contributing structure in D.C.’s Sheridan-
Kalorama Historic District, and was also recognized in the National Register of Historic Places.67  
The applicant, Kalorama Heights Limited Partnership (“KHLP”), wished to demolish the Moses 
House and develop the site as a six-story, twelve unit multi- family luxury condominium building 
with underground parking. 68  KHLP claimed that this luxury condominium was a project of 
special merit on grounds that it would confer “social or other benefits having a high priority for 
community services.”  Specifically, KHLP argued that the benefits conferred by its project 
included: (1) the generation of additional tax revenues; (2) an increase in the stock of luxury 
condominiums in the District of Columbia; and (3) prevention of the building’s potential use as a 
                                                 
65 Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 655 A.2d 865 (D.C. 
1995). 
66 See Kalorama Heights , 655 A.2d at 867. 
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chancery. 69  The Mayor’s Agent had denied the demolition permit, finding that the applicant 
failed to meet the “special merit” standard.    
 In reviewing whether the decision of the Mayor’s Agent was supported by substantial 
evidence, the court reached behind Committee of 100 to grab the proposition that an applicant 
must show that it considered alternatives to the proposed demolition, and that such alternatives 
were unreasonable.70  The court pointed to the Mayor’s Agent’s rational determination that 
KHLP failed to meet this burden because it had failed to show that there were no other 
alternatives for this site, such as “maintaining the façade of the Moses House and converting the 
interior into a multi- family dwelling...”71  The lack of proposed alternatives thus raised doubts as 
to whether the proposed project truly was necessary.    
 The court then addressed the petitioner’s argument that the Mayor’s Agent had erred 
because he “failed to weigh the historical significance of Moses House against the benefits that 
KHLP’s project would confer upon the District.”72  Following Committee of 100 on this point, 
the court made clear that a balancing inquiry need not be undertaken unless the Mayor’s Agent 
finds that the project has “special merit.”73  In this case, the court agreed with the Mayor’s Agent 
that the project’s alleged “special merit” was not supported by the evidence, and thus no 
balancing inquiry was required.  Specifically, the court discredited each prong of the applicant’s 
special merit argument: (1) as to increased tax revenue, the court was not convinced that the 
prospect of revenues in and of themselves warranted a finding of special merit, and, moreover, 
the prospect of revenues in this case had not been demonstrated with reasonable certainty; (2) as 
to increasing the supply of housing, it had not been proven that the only way such housing could 
                                                                                                                                                             
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 868. 
69 See id. at 869 n.6.  Use of buildings as chanceries is considered by some District residents to be a Locally Undesirable Land 
Use.  Neighbors often fret over the noise generated from the diplomats’ soirees and other such nuisances.   
70 See id. at 869 (citing Rhodes Tavern and Don’t Tear It Down). 
71 See id. at 869 n.6.   
72 See id. at 869. 
73 See id. 
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be achieved was through demolition; and (3) as to the contention that prevention of the site’s use 
as a chancery had a “high priority for community services,” it was pointed out that the applicable 
zoning regulations only discouraged use of such land for chanceries, but did not prohibit such 
uses, and, moreover, “the community had made it clear” that it would prefer a chancery to a 
condominium project at this site.74 
 The court concluded that “KHLP has neither shown that its project has social or other 
benefits that differ from those of other condominium projects nor demonstrated that [it] 
considered reasonable alternatives to complete demolition,”75 and thus agreed with the Mayor’s 
Agent that the special merit burden had not been satisfied.  
* * * 
Thus, as shaped by a body of appellate- level case law developed during the first two 
decades of the Act, the following principles summarize what appear to be the controlling 
elements of a special merit inquiry: 
1. An applicant must show that a proposed project is “necessary”.  
Demonstration that “reasonable alternatives” to demolition were considered 
satisfies this test. 
2. A balancing test, weighing the value of what would be lost by the 
proposed demolition against the benefits that the community or the District stands 
to gain from the proposed project, is required by the Act under certain 
circumstances. The circumstances under which the balancing test is required are 
limited to cases where the Mayor’s Agent has determined that the proposed 
project is one of “special merit”. 
 
                                                 
74 See id. at 870. 
75 Id.  
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 With the principles of a special merit inquiry as supported by an analysis of controlling 
case authority thus established, a review of how such principles have (or have not) been applied 
in proceedings before the Mayor’s Agent should provide additional insight to those seeking to 
navigate the parameters of the special merit exemption in D.C.   
 
 
III. Mayor’s Agent Decisions Substantially Addressing Special Merit 
  
A. General Comments 
 
 The one hundred and one (101) decisions of the Mayor’s Agent for Historic Preservation 
issued during 1981 – 2001 and published on the Georgetown University Law Library’s website 
through its D.C. Historic Preservation Law Project76 were reviewed for their discussion of 
special merit.  Twenty-six (26) of these cases offered substantive decisions concerning special 
merit’s application. 77   
                                                 
76 See http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/histpres/presdecisions.html. 
77 These 26 cases are: (1) In re Application for a Demolition Permit for a Building Located at 1406 New York Avenue, N.W., Lot 
18 in Square 223, HPA No. 81-521 (May 11, 1981) (“Bond Building”); (2) In re Application for Demolition and New 
Construction Located at 601 13th Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, HPA No. 83-478 (June 29, 1984) (“Homer Building”), aff’d, 
In re Application for Revised Preliminary Design Review for a Building Located at 601 13th Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, 
HPA No. 86-660 (Dec. 16, 1986) (conclusion of 83-478 upheld when applicant submitted minor design change); (3) In re 
Application for Demolition, Alteration, and New Construction in Square 345 Bounded by G, H, 10th, and 11th Streets, N.W., HPA 
No. 84-448 (Jan. 14, 1985) (“Palais Royal”); (4) In re Applications to Raze Certain Squares on 9th Street, N.W., and E Street, 
N.W., HPA Nos. 86-302–86-305, 86-311, 86-491 (Dec. 15, 1986) (“Quadrangle”); (5) In re The Woodward Building, 1426 H 
Street, N.W., Square 222, Lot 22, HPA No. 86-729 (Feb. 19, 1988) (“Woodward” or “Woodward Building”); (6) In re 
Application of Archdiocese of Washington & K&C Associates’ Rhode Island Limited Partnership, HPA Nos. 87-147–87-150 
(Dec. 22, 1987) (“St. Matthews”); (7) In re Application of District of Columbia Department of Public Works, HPA No. 87-377 
(Aug. 20, 1987) (“Duke Ellington Memorial Bridge”); (8) In re Tivoli Theatre, 14th Street & Park Road, N.W., Square 2837, 
Parcel 29 in the 14th St. Urban Renewal Plan, HPA No. 88-258 (May 14, 1992); (9) In re Clover F Street Associates, L.P., HPA 
Nos. 88-490–88-493 (1988?); (10) In re Application for Partial Demolition Permits for Buildings Located at 810-820 7th Street, 
N.W., HPA Nos. 88-825 & 88-826 (Mar. 1, 1989) (“King’s Palace”), aff’d, In re 810-820 7th Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 88-825 & 
88-826 (Dec. 7, 1992) (approving change in location of amenities from below grade space to contiguous street level space); (11) 
In re Engine Co. No. 24, Square 2900, Lot 816, HPA No. 93-330 (Mar. 31, 1994); (12) In re 507-525 11th Street, N.W., HPA 
Nos. 94-157–94-175 (Jul. 28, 1994); modified, In re 507-525 11th Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 94-157–94-175 (Mar. 6, 1996); (13) In 
re Capitol House Condominium, HPA No. 95-10 (June 23, 1995); (14) In re 214 7th Street, N.E., HPA No. 95-78 (Oct. 6, 1995) 
(“the Louise”); (15) In re Square 456, Old Hecht Company Dept. Store Complex, HPA Nos. 95-440–95-448 (Sept. 11, 1996); 
(16) In re Lots 911 & 829, Square 5770, 1901, 1909, 1911 & 1913, Martin Luther King, Jr., Ave., S.E., HPA Nos. 98-116, 98-
117, 98-119 & 98-121 (Jul. 1, 1998) (“Anacostia Gateway”); (17) In re Lots 800, 801, 27 & 28, Square 5791, 1230, 1232, 1234 
& 1236 Pleasant Street, S.E., HPA Nos. 98-150–98-153 (Aug. 5, 1998) (“Union Temple Baptist Church”); (18) In re 3133 
Copperthwaite Alley, N.W., HPA Nos. 98-355–98-361, S.O. No. 1643 (Oct. 6, 1998) (“Brickyard Hill House”); (19) In re 
Archdiocese of Washington, HPA Nos. 99-219–99-222, 99-224–99-226 & 99-285 (Nov. 9, 1999) (“St. Patrick’s I”); (20) In re 
1360 Half Street, S.W., Square 0653, Lot 0825, HPA Nos. 99-401–99-402 & 99-404 (Dec. 13, 1999) (“Syphax School”); (21) In 
re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000); (22) In re The Phillips Collection, HPA 
No. 00-405 (Oct. 11, 2000); (23) In re Application for Demolition of the Webster School and for New Construction, HPA No. 
00-462 (Feb. 15, 2001); (24) In re Calvary Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601 & 01-044 (Apr. 20, 2001); (25) In re Application of 
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As a general observation, many of these Mayor’s Agent decisions found that a proposed 
project both met the special merit standard and was consistent with the Act.78  This interpretation 
is inconsistent with court cases interpreting the special merit standard—all of which appear to 
treat a “special merit” project as something distinct and separate from a project “consistent with 
the Act.”79  Moreover, this interpretation is incompatible with the statute’s plain language and 
legislative history.  Recall that the statute prohibits any demolition permit from issuing unless the 
Mayor makes a finding that such demolition is “necessary in the public interest”, which is 
defined to mean consistent with the purposes of the Act  “or” necessary to allow the construction 
of a project of special merit.80  The legislative history emphasizes that, “No permit for 
demolition…may be issued unless it is found (i) that… the building does not contribute to the 
character of the district or landmark [e.g., is consistent with the purposes of the Act]; or (ii) that 
the demolition is necessary to allow the construction of a project of special merit” (emphasis 
original).81   
On a conceptual level, can a proposal be both consistent with the Act and a project of 
special merit?  To be consistent with the Act really means “consistent with the purposes of this 
subchapter as set forth in § 6-1101(b).”  For historic landmarks, these purposes are “to retain and 
enhance historic landmarks in the District of Columbia and to encourage their adaptation for 
current use;” for structures in historic districts, these purposes are “to retain and enhance those 
properties which contribute to the character of the historic district and to encourage their 
                                                                                                                                                             
James Son for Alteration, Curb Cut, and Parking Lot, HPA No. 01-100 (Dec. 14, 2001); (26) In re The John Akridge Companies 
and the Archdiocese of Washington, HPA No. 01-219–224 & 01-208–01-209 (Aug. 1, 2001) (“St. Patrick’s II”). 
78 See, e.g., In re The Phillips Collection, HPA No. 00-405 (Oct. 11, 2000) (finding a demolition project to be consistent with the 
purposes of the Act because its design included restoration of a contributing façade, which would “enhance the historic district, 
while maintaining a new and current use”, but also holding the project to be one of special merit on exemplary architecture 
grounds).  
79 See Don’t Tear It Down, 428 A.2d at 373; Rhodes Tavern, 432 A.2d at 715; Committee of 100, 571 A.2d at 199; Kalorama 
Heights, 655 A.2d at 869. 
80 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1102(10). 
81 NADINE P. WINTER, CHAIR OF THE D.C. COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON BILL 2-367, “THE 
HISTORIC LANDMARK AND HISTORIC DISTRICT PROTECTION ACT OF 1978,” 2 (Oct. 5, 1978). 
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adaptation for current use,” (emphasis added).82  Thus, the language of the statute contained in § 
6-1101(b) sets a very high hurdle to pass for any project involving demolition.   
Given this language, perhaps a demolition project conceptually could be found to be both 
consistent with the Act and a project of special merit because the permit application emphasized 
one listed purpose of § 6-1101(b) over the other, e.g., encouraging adaptation for current use 
over retaining and enhancing the structure.  However, recent authority from the D.C. Court of 
Appeals suggests that such an interpretation is in itself inconsistent with the Act.  Gondelman v. 
District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs,83 in which an applicant 
argued that his proposed curb cut was consistent with the Act, declared:  
“Here, we are satisfied that the Mayor’s Agent’s decision gives effect to the entire 
Act in light of its policies and objectives, and that concentration on a single 
provision, in isolation as the petitioners would have us do, is inappropriate 
[citations omitted]…  The petitioners’ burden under § 6-1105(f) is a heavy one. 
[This section provides the same standard for alterations within an historic district 
as § 6-1104(e) provides for demolitions.]  They must demonstrate that the 
issuance of a preliminary permit for their proposed alterations is “necessary in the 
public interest.”  To demonstrate necessity in the public interest, they must meet 
two statutory requirements. First, under § 6-1101(b)(1)(A), they must establish 
that their proposed alterations “retain and enhance . . . [historic] properties [in a 
manner] which contributes to the character of the historic district and [which] 
encourages the[] adaptation [of historic properties] for current use.” [citations 
omitted] (emphasis added). Under this subsection it is insufficient to emphasize 
only enhancement to adapt a property for current use.  Rather, the applicant must 
also demonstrate that the proposed alterations will retain and enhance the historic 
property so that it contributes to the character of the historical district” (emphasis 
added).84 
 
Most of the Mayor’s Agent’s decisions in which it was found that a project could be both 
consistent with the Act and a project of special merit adopt an approach different from that 
announced by Gondelman.  In re Calvary Baptist Church, decided in 2001,85 is a good example.  
The applicants proposed to “partially demolish”86 the Calvary Baptist Church’s Greene 
                                                 
82 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1101(b). 
83 Gondelman v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 789 A.2d 1238 (D.C. 2002). 
84 See Gondelman, 789 A.2d at 1245-1246. 
85 In re Calvary Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601 & 01-044 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
86 Although discussed in terms of a “partial demolition,” only the façade is mentioned as a specific portion of the Greene 
Memorial Building scheduled to be retained.  See Calvary Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601 & 01-044 at 8-9. 
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Memorial Building, a contributing structure in the Downtown Historic District, while retaining 
its façade and also conducting extensive renovation of the original Calvary Baptist Church 
Building.  The Mayor’s Agent found the proposed project to be consistent with the purposes of 
the Act because “it involves significant exterior restoration of the Calvary Church building to its 
historic appearance, which the HPRB specifically determined… would ‘constitute an unusual 
and substantial historic preservation accomplishment’…”87  He went on to find this project one 
of special merit on grounds that the outreach to the homeless and working poor and other 
services provided by the Church constituted “social or other benefits” rising to the level of 
special merit.  In effect, rather than finding that the proposed demolition was consistent with the 
Act, as Gondelman suggests, the Mayor’s Agent appears to parcel out the various aspects of this 
project, holding some of them to be “consistent with the Act” while holding others to be of 
“special merit.”   
It is difficult to reconcile the Mayor’s Agent’s “parceling” not only with the recent 
Gondelman decision, but also with the language of the Act.  The statute expressly states that 
before the Mayor can issue “a permit to demolish…the Mayor [must find] that issuance of the 
permit [to demolish] is necessary in the public interest…”88  Moreover, is it in the best purposes 
of the development of D.C. historic preservation law to have approvals of demolition permits 
based in part upon factors of the project not significantly related to the actual demolition itself?   
In light of this, perhaps on a conceptual level, only projects that involve interior 
demolition can properly be found to be both consistent with the Act and a project of special 
merit.  This type of demolition could potentially “retain and enhance” the historic structure as 
well as “encourage its adaptation for current use.” 
Of course, another way to address the problems posed by finding projects to be both 
consistent with the Act and of special merit, is to adopt a doctrine that a demolition project can 
                                                 
87 See id. at 13-14. 
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no longer be approved on both grounds.  In subsequent decisions, the Mayor’s Agent could 
adhere to a strict regimen of “either/or”: projects could be found to be either consistent with the 
Act or constituting special merit.   
Another troublesome general observation was that the Mayor’s Agent sometimes seemed 
to find the “preservation element” of documentation to be such a compelling “feature of land 
planning” or “social or other benefit,” that the documentation itself was used to support findings 
allowing demolition of the historic structure.89  How is it possible that under the special merit 
inquiry the “preservation benefits” offered by a photograph could outweigh the retention of an 
actual historic structure?   
The doctrinal problem aside, from a practical standpoint, the current regime relies too 
heavily upon applicants to suggest documentation as part of a proposed demolition project.  If a 
project is going to be approved on special merit grounds, the Mayor’s Agent should require 
documentation as a condition of granting approval of the demolition permit.  If the Mayor’s 
Agent does not require such documentation as a matter of course in every special merit case, we 
run the risk that some historic structures will be torn down without archival photographs, etc. 
that could be used to remember the building or educate others about its significance in the future.  
A case in point:  in 1998, the Mayor’s Agent approved the razing of four vacant, but 
contributing, buildings located in the so-called “gateway” of the Anacostia Historic District.90  
Documentation of these structures, which had deteriorated over time, was not required as a 
condition of the approval to demolish them, and the applicant did not propose such 
documentation as part of its demolition permit application.  Anacostia is one of the central 
communities important to the District of Columbia’s African-American history.  The lack of 
documentation concerning these structures prior to their demolition may mean that part of this 
                                                                                                                                                             
88 See D.C. Code Ann. § 6-1104(a) & (e). 
89 See, e.g., In re Clover F Street Associates, L.P., HPA Nos. 88-490–88-493 (1988?); In re Square 456, Old Hecht Company 
Dept. Store Complex, HPA Nos. 95-440–95-448 (Sept. 11, 1996). 
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rich history is now lost.  This would not be the case if documentation of historic structures were 
required as a condition of “special merit” demolition permit approval.   
Finally, the Mayor’s Agent opinions gave sparse indication as to whether and what sorts 
of unique project characteristics might amount to a project of special merit.  After all, a project 
can qualify as one of “special merit” only if its exemplary architecture, specific features of land 
planning, or social or other benefits having a high priority for community services are 
sufficiently “special” to warrant the demolition of an historic resource.  The Act’s legislative 
history implies that “factors which are common to all projects” are not considered sufficiently 
special to comprise a project of special merit (emphasis added).91  The Mayor’s Agent has 
tended to interpret “common” factors as those elements required by the zoning classification. 92  
Interestingly, the Mayor’s Agent also seems to have found that projects which merely exceed 
applicable zoning requirements are sufficiently “uncommon” to constitute projects of special 
merit.93  But is exceeding the applicable zoning requirements really what is contemplated by the 
concept of “special” merit?  To be sure, “special” does not necessarily have to mean 
“uncommon;” one sentence in a legislative history should not confine a community’s ability to 
determine how, and in what ways, it will develop.  Indeed, if commonality is the only 
determinative concept of “special,” over time, the hurdle of what is truly “special” would be an 
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, test to satisfy.  Thus, perhaps the Mayor’s Agent should 
look beyond what is merely “common” today to embrace a broader concept of what might be 
considered “special.”94  For example, a grocery store in an historic district may be something that 
is quite common in the D.C. area, and a proposal to build one on a certain plot of land may not 
                                                                                                                                                             
90 See In re Lots 911 & 829, Square 5770, 1901, 1909, 1911 & 1913, Martin Luther King, Jr., Ave., S.E., HPA Nos. 98-116, 98-
117, 98-119 & 98-121 (Jul. 1, 1998) (“Anacostia Gateway”). 
91 NADINE P. WINTER, CHAIR OF THE D.C. COMMITTEE ON HOUSING A ND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON BILL 2-367, “THE 
HISTORIC LANDMARK AND HISTORIC DISTRICT PROTECTION ACT OF 1978,” 6 (Oct. 5, 1978). 
92 See, e.g., In re Application for Demolition of the Webster School and for New Construction, HPA No. 00-462 (Feb. 15, 2001). 
93 In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000). 
94 Certainly, “special” also can mean being in some way “superior”, held in particular esteem, or “readily distinguishable” from 
others of the same category.  See Webster's Tenth Collegiate Dictionary 1128 (1996). 
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exceed applicable zoning requirements.  But a grocery store on a particular block might just be 
that “something special” which a neighborhood, thirsty for economic growth or a community 
centerpiece, had in mind for the development of its unique cultural heritage.  The Mayor’s Agent 
should thus guard against the automatic disqualification of certain projects from a complete 
special merit inquiry because what they propose is “common.”             
 
B. Decisions on the “Necessary” and “Reasonable Alternatives” Test 
 
Despite what appears to be a clear mandate from both the statute’s language and the 
appellate level decisions, many Mayor’s Agent opinions did not consider whether a project was 
“necessary” at all.95  These cases only examined the proposal at issue to determine if it could 
pass special merit muster (i.e., on grounds of “exemplary architecture,” “specific features of land 
planning,” or “social or other benefits having a high priority for community services”), with no 
discussion of whether reasonable alternatives to demolition might exist.  
Other cases appeared to address indirectly whether a project was “necessary”.  For 
example, In re Palais Royal, in which the applicant proposed to partially demolish a local 
historic landmark in order to construct a hotel/office complex, the Mayor’s Agent did not use the 
term “necessary”, but did discuss how the floor-to-ceiling configuration of the historic structure 
would force misalignments with windows in virtually any modern construction project that 
attempted to renovate (rather than demolish) the historic structure.96  Another case, In re 
                                                 
95 See In re Application for a Demolition Permit for a Building Located at 1406 New York Avenue, N.W., Lot 18 in Square 223, 
HPA No. 81-521 (May 11, 1981) (“Bond Building”); In re Application for Demolition and New Construction Located at 601 13th 
Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, HPA No. 83-478, at 7 (June 29, 1984) (“Homer Building”); In re Application of Archdiocese 
of Washington & K&C Associates’ Rhode Island Limited Partnership, HPA Nos. 87-147–87-150 (Dec. 22, 1987) (“St. 
Matthews”); In re Tivoli Theatre, 14th Street & Park Road, N.W., Square 2837, Parcel 29 in the 14th St. Urban Renewal Plan, 
HPA No. 88-258 (May 14, 1992); In re Application for Partial Demolition Permits for Buildings Located at 810-820 7th Street, 
N.W., HPA Nos. 88-825 & 88-826 (Mar. 1, 1989) (“King’s Palace”); In re 507-525 11th Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 94-157–94-175 
(Jul. 28, 1994); In re Capitol House Condominium, HPA No. 95-10 (June 23, 1995); In re 214 7th Street, N.E., HPA No. 95-78 
(Oct. 6, 1995) (“the Louise”); In re Square 456, Old Hecht Company Dept. Store Complex, HPA Nos. 95-440–95-448 (Sept. 11, 
1996); In re Calvary Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601 & 01-044 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
96 See In re Application for Demolition, Alteration, and New Construction in Square 345 Bounded by G, H, 10th, and 11th Streets, 
N.W., HPA No. 84-448 (Jan. 14, 1985) (“Palais Royal”). 
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Anacostia Gateway,97  did not use the word “necessary” to describe a project to raze four 
contributing structures located in the Anacostia Historic District.  However, redevelopment of 
this portion of Anacostia was characterized as “essential,” and the estimated costs to retain the 
façades of these structures—$300,000 to $410,000—was an amount that was considered to be 
“infeasible” by the Mayor’s Agent “when compared with the rate of rental return the Applicant 
can expect to garner, given the location and economic history of the particular location.”98     
On the other hand, the very few Mayor’s Agent opinions which directly addressed 
whether a proposed demolition project was “necessary” did so in a manner that seems consistent 
with the statute and court precedent.  In re JBG Real Estate Associates99 discussed how the 
developer, JBG, had studied several design options, including complete preservation of the 
buildings, but had determined that these other options would either increase the amount of 
demolition that would need to take place to accomplish the project, or “render the Project 
economically unfeasible.”100  The Mayor’s Agent went on to state that the consideration and 
“comprehensive analysis” of options before arriving at “an optimal preservation solution” 
demonstrated that the partial demolition as proposed was “necessary” to construct the project of 
special merit.101   Another Mayor’s Agent opinion addressed whether a project was “necessary” 
by referencing the extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that had been conducted by 
the applicant, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, prior to its application for a 
permit to demolish an historic firehouse.102 
Missing from all these decisions—even those in which application of a “necessary” test 
was evident—is commentary concerning what “necessary” ought to mean in the context of 
D.C.’s historic preservation law.  In the tradition of Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. 
                                                 
97 In re Anacostia Gateway, Lots 911 & 829, Square 5770, 1901, 1909, 1911 & 1913, Martin Luther King, Jr., Ave., S.E., HPA 
Nos. 98-116, 98-117, 98-119 & 98-121 (Jul. 1, 1998) (“Anacostia Gateway”). 
98 See id. at 4, 7. 
99 In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000). 
100 See JBG Associates at 24.  
101 See id. at 24. 
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Maryland,103 it seems as though the Mayor’s Agents have put to rest the idea that the special 
merit exemption extends only to demolition that is “absolutely necessary.”  The fact that the 
mere physical possibility of renovation exists, regardless of cost, time, or technical feasibility, 
cannot be dispositive of the “necessary” inquiry. 104  Yet it seems equally unsatisfactory to make 
determinations of “necessity” based entirely upon a developer’s consideration of alternatives.  
Perhaps the proper scope of “necessity” could be found in an enhanced special merit application 
process.  Applicants could be required to submit to the Historic Preservation Review Board 
evidence of the alternatives to demolition which were considered, as well as detailed information 
concerning why the various alternatives were rejected.  Likewise, opponents to a demolition 
application should be afforded an opportunity to submit to the Historic Preservation Review 
Board suggested alternatives to demolition in the context of the proposed project.  The Review 
Board could then make an express finding for the Mayor’s Agent concerning its views as to the 
necessity of a particular project.  Such a process, at a minimum, could lead better-informed 
Mayor’s Agent decisions, and might also contribute to greater clarity in the development of D.C. 
preservation law regarding “necessity.”  
 
C. Decisions on the Balancing Test 
 
Every special merit case decided by the Mayor’s Agent at least implicitly “balanced” the 
loss of an historic structure against what the community stood to gain from the proposed project 
of special merit.  However, some cases conducted this balancing test more carefully than others.  
A good example is In re 3133 Copperthwaite Alley (“Brickyard Hill House”),105 in which the 
                                                                                                                                                             
102 See In re Engine Co. No. 24, Square 2900, Lot 816, HPA No. 93-330 (Mar. 31, 1994). 
103 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution, rather than confine Congress to the realm of the indispensable, permits Congress to pass any laws consistent with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution).  
104 See, e.g., JBG Associates; see also, Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous. and Community 
Development, 428 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981). 
105 In re 3133 Copperthwaite Alley, N.W., HPA Nos. 98-355–98-361, S.O. No. 1643 (Oct. 6, 1998) (“Brickyard Hill House”). 
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Mayor’s Agent attempted to lay a foundation for addressing the “balancing test” in special merit 
cases.   
The case involved an applicant’s proposal to subdivide106 and alter several historic 
structures located in the Georgetown Historic District.  The purpose of the subdivision would be 
to allow the developer to create a mixed-use complex consisting of a 500-space parking garage, 
100,000 square feet of condominium units, a 125-room hotel, a 2000-3000 seat movie theater, 
and 75,000 square feet of additional retail space.  The proposal included the complete restoration 
of the Brickyard Hill House, an individually designa ted landmark, two alley dwellings and 
another contributing structure called the Georgetown Incinerator (which had been vacant since 
the 1970s).  It was estimated that the proposed project, when complete, would generate 
$8,000,000 in taxes for the District, create 352 permanent jobs, produce market rate housing 
units, provide badly needed public parking, and fill a void left by the closing of two nearby 
movie theaters.  Granted, although there really wasn’t all that much to lose with this project, the 
Mayor’s Agent laid down “balancing test” principles, and then followed them in his analysis (a 
process that was lacking in many of the other cases). 
The Mayor’s Agent discussed that, in enacting the “special merit” provision, the Council 
envisioned the balancing of a proposed project’s merit with the historic value of the contributing 
building “because only projects which offer significant benefits to the District of Columbia or to 
the community offset the Council’s policy in favor of protecting, enhancing and perpetuating the 
use of properties with historical, cultural and aesthetic merit.”107  The Mayor’s Agent continued 
that to meet the special merit balancing test, a proposed project must pass “rigorous criteria,” and 
that factors common to all projects would not be considered “special.”108  He compared what had 
been considered in the past to “outweigh” the loss contemplated by the project (such as a one-of-
                                                 
106 The proposal also included demolitions of several non-contributing structures.  
107 See In re Brickyard Hill House, at 12 (discussing Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Hous. and 
Community Development, 428 A.2d 369 (D.C. 1981)). 
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a-kind building project which benefited more than just a few people, and projects that 
incorporated historic structures).  Here, the Mayor’s Agent noted, what the community stood to 
gain far outweighed any loss (the gains included full building restoration of four distinct 
buildings, arts, retail, residential and parking additions).  In light of the balancing test in which 
he had engaged, the Mayor’s Agent approved the proposal. 
The Mayor’s Agent decisions also seemed to leave unresolved an issue presented by the 
controlling case authority.  Namely, the Mayor’s Agent cases did not clearly address whether 
special merit cases should proceed first by determining whether a proposed project is sufficiently 
“special,” and then continue with a balancing test (as was proposed by Committee of 100 and 
Kalorama Heights).109  If procedural clarity and predictability is to be enhanced, the Mayor’s 
Agent should address this issue of timing.   
 
D. Decisions on Whether a Project Qualifies as one of “Special Merit” 
 
No court has found that the statute’s instructions concerning “special merit” are unfairly 
broad or vague.  They also have not offered specific guidance as to what sorts of projects might 
fall within these three special merit categories.  The decisions of the Mayor’s Agent, on the other 
hand, do shed some clarifying light on these terms.    
A few Mayor’s Agent decisions laid down principles concerning what sorts of projects 
would almost never satisfy the special merit standard under any test.  For example, the Mayor’s 
Agent concluded that dumpsters covered with fences within the public view in historic districts 
were inconsistent with the Act, provided no significant benefits to the community, and did not 
demonstrate any specific features of land planning.110   Parking lots (by themselves) also have 
been shunned from the special merit exemption. 111  Upon review of an application to replace a 
                                                                                                                                                             
108 See id. at 12. 
109 See infra pp. 12-19. 
110 See In re Capitol House Condominium, HPA No. 95-10 (June 23, 1995). 
111 See In re 214 7th Street, N.E., HPA No. 95-78 (Oct. 6, 1995) (“the Louise”); In re Lots 800, 801, 27 & 28, Square 5791, 1230, 
1232, 1234 & 1236 Pleasant Street, S.E., HPA Nos. 98-150–98-153 (Aug. 5, 1998) (“Union Temple Baptist Church”). 
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deteriorating three-story brick apartment building (known as “the Louise”) in the Capitol Hill 
Historic District with a parking lot, the Mayor’s Agent stated that, as a matter of law, “It is also 
clear that a parking lot in no way is a project of special merit, in that it does not have significant 
benefits to the District or the community because of any exemplary architecture, features of land 
planning or the bestowing of benefits to the community.”112  Likewise, applicants urging the 
Mayor’s Agent to approve a curb cut as a project of special merit face an uphill battle.113  
Beyond these “absolutely not” categories, the Mayor’s Agent’s opinions on special merit 
classifications varied in terms of the reasoning and result.  Timing played a role, with the earlier 
cases general recipients of a more generous, pro-demolition view of special merit, while later 
cases generally reflected a narrower vision of special merit.  All inquiries were extremely fact 
intensive.  Nonetheless, certain themes concerning treatment of special merit elements did 
emerge from the cases, and these themes will be discussed below.  Note that although the special 
merit cases will be highlighted for their consideration of a specific “prong” (e.g., exemplary 
architecture, specific features of land planning, or social or other benefits having a high priority 
for community services), in many cases the Mayor’s Agent determined that a proposed project 
satisfied one or more of the three special merit criteria.  
1. Special Merit: By Virtue  of Exemplary Architecture 114 
Only a handful of projects were declared by the Mayor’s Agent to have 
architecture so “exemplary” that it warranted the demolition of historic resources.115  
Partial demolition of the Homer Building, located at 601 13th Street, N.W. and listed as a 
                                                 
112 See In re The Louise at 7.  Readers may find it interesting that The Louise is now fully restored.   
113 See In re Application of James Son for Alteration, Curb Cut, and Parking Lot, HPA No. 01-100, at 8 (Dec. 14, 2001) (holding 
that to meet the special merit standard, a project need not be of epic proportions, but “must benefit more than just a small group 
of people”; moreover, the Mayor’s Agent considered that project would result in a loss of on-street parking, which was a 
detriment, not benefit, to the community at large). 
114 For a more extensive inquiry into the t opic of what might make architecture “exemplary,” see Seanna Beck Garrison, Is 
Exemplary Architecture a Potential Loophole in the District of Columbia’s Historic Preservation Statute?, (April 15, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, copy available from the author). 
115 See In re Application for Demolition and New Construction Located at 601 13th Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, HPA No. 
83-478, at 7 (June 29, 1984) (“Homer Building”); In re Application for Demolition, Alteration, and New Construction in Square 
345 Bounded by G, H, 10th, and 11th Streets, N.W., HPA No. 84-448 (Jan. 14, 1985) (“ Palais Royal”); In re Application of 
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landmark on the District of Columbia’s Inventory of Historic Sites, was approved in 
order to build a mixed-use office/retail building because the architecture of the proposal 
would accomplish what was originally envisioned, but never completed for this site.116  
The Mayor’s Agent found that the original design specifications for the Homer Building 
site included a structure that was to be eight or nine stories tall.  In addition to realizing 
the height of the original design, the applicant’s project would restore the façades to their 
original condition as well as incorporate other architectural details that go “far beyond 
what is usually meant as a ‘compatible’ addition.”117  Thus, the Mayor’s Agent appeared 
to find the proposal’s architectural familiarity and compatibility to qualify as 
“exemplary.”   
This approach also was adopted in a matter approving the partial demolition, 
renovation and rehabilitation of four contributing rowhouse structures in the Dupont 
Circle Historic District, in order to create a Planned Unit Development (“PUD”) for the 
Archdiocese of Washington. 118  The PUD proposed a mixed-use development, involving 
the construction of a new building approximately 132 feet high, which would generate 
substantial income to renovate and maintain St. Matthews Cathedral and Rectory.  The 
Mayor’s Agent found that the project achieved a design that would protect the visual 
dominance of St. Matthews Cathedral, minimizing the impact that the proposed new 
building would have on the cathedral and the surrounding area.  The project’s set backs 
on all sides of the building were thought to “open up light and air” and the resulting 
                                                                                                                                                             
Archdiocese of Washington & K&C Associates’ Rhode Island Limited Partnership, HPA Nos. 87-147–87-150 (Dec. 22, 1987) 
(“St. Matthews”); In re The Phillips Collection, HPA No. 00-405 (Oct. 11, 2000). 
116 See In re Application for Demolition and New Construction Located at 601 13th Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, HPA No. 
83-478, at 7 (June 29, 1984) (“Homer Building”). 
117 See In re Homer Building at 4, 7. 
118 See In re Application of Archdiocese of Washington & K&C Associates’ Rhode Island Limited Partnership, HPA Nos. 87-
147–87-150 (Dec. 22, 1987) (“St. Matthews”). 
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design held to “compliment the scale, character, fenestration and color of the existing 
buildings…”119 
The handful of exemplary architecture decisions seem to indicate that the Mayor’s 
Agent might harbor a preference for finding architecture which simply extends or 
compliments the original design as “exemplary.”  This may reflect a value judgment 
often assigned to preservationists; namely, that people are motivated to protect segments 
of the past because of a dislike for the work of the present.120 
 
2. Special Merit:  By Virtue of Specific Features of Land Planning 
 
It was sometimes difficult to determine whether the Mayor’s Agent had found that 
a project constituted a special merit project based upon “land planning” or whether 
specific features of land planning themselves constituted benefits “having a high priority 
for community services.”  For example, these lines were particularly blurred in a 1999 
case authorizing the partial demolition of the Syphax School site, a designated landmark 
on the D.C. Inventory of Historic Sites originally built for the education of African-
American students in the District, but which had grown into a “blighted abandoned 
building and source of community crime”. 121  Manna, Inc., a developer specializing in 
affordable housing, proposed to demolish the Syphax School’s 1941 and 1953 additions, 
restore the original 1901 Syphax Building, and build 29 new townhouses and 12 
condominiums of affordable housing.  (At the time of application, it was estimated that 
the townhouses would be offered for sale between $114,000-$119,000).  The Mayor’s 
Agent approved the proposal as one of special merit because of its “benefits having a 
high priority for community services.”  However, most of the “benefits” cited—
                                                 
119 See id. at 6, 8. 
120 See generally, Richard Longstreth, When the Present Becomes Past, in Antoinette Lee (ed.), Past Meets Future: Saving 
America’s Environment (1992). 
121 See In re 1360 Half Street, S.W., Square 0653, Lot 0825, HPA Nos. 99-401–99-402 & 99-404 (Dec. 13, 1999) (“Syphax 
School”). 
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promotion of several aspects of the D.C. Comprehensive Plan, including increasing the 
low-income housing stock and making vacant surplus schools available for hous ing—are 
in fact specific features of land planning.122  
That being said, some general themes concerning “land planning” can be 
extrapolated from the Mayor’s Agent opinions.  Successful special merit “land planning” 
applications were mixed-use projects in nature, and always tied the project’s uses to 
several diverse goals articulated in the D.C. Comprehensive Plan. 123  In re JBG Real 
Estate Associates provides a good example of this.124  The applicants sought to demolish 
all but the first twenty (20) feet of three contributing structures facing Booth’s Alley 
(through which the notorious assassin is said to have escaped) in the Pennsylvania 
Avenue National Historic District, in order to build a mixed-use 130-unit residential 
complex, with dedicated space for retail and arts.  The proposal was linked to no fewer 
than twenty-two (22) sections of the D.C. Comprehensive Plan specifying preferred land 
uses.125  These features included developing a “critical mass” of downtown housing, 
implementing the objective of a downtown Arts District, and attracting new residents and 
jobs to downtown, among others.   
A demonstration that what was being proposed exceeded applicable zoning 
requirements also proved useful for “land planning” applications; those applicants who 
were unable to demonstrate that their proposal exceeded applicable zoning requirements 
often were unsuccessful.126  For example, applicants In re The Webster School proposed 
to partially demolish a deteriorating local landmark (that had once been the site of an 
Americanization School for citizenship classes) located in downtown D.C. near the 
                                                 
122 See In re Syphax School at 14-15 (citing 10 DCMR §§ 300.4, 301.3). 
123 See, e.g., In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000); 
124 See, e.g., In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000). 
125 See id. at 12. 
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Convention Center, in order to construct an office building to house the National 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and a Culinary Institute Culinary Arts School. 127  
This proposal was characterized as “mixed-use” because it included a restaurant, which 
was argued to promote general goals of a “living downtown.”  However, the Mayor’s 
Agent found that the proposal failed to demonstrate that it “went beyond what was 
minimally required by the zoning regulations,” and was thus not approved as a project of 
special merit on “land planning” grounds.128  By contrast, the project mentioned earlier In 
re JBG Real Estate Associates highlighted that it would involve construction of buildings 
of less height and bulk than was allowable under zoning laws, and, furthermore, even 
though the project’s uses had a “high priority” in achieving the District’s Living 
Downtown Policy, the uses were not expressly required by the applicable zoning 
classification. 129   
Retention of at least some portion of the façades of historic buildings sought to be 
demolished, and use of appropriate “massing” or set backs for the structures to be erected 
in the buildings’ place also was often equated with the land planning feature 
“preservation” and was required in nearly all special merit cases (although never used 
alone to justify demolition of an historic structure on land planning grounds).130  Note 
that over the years, the amount of building that must be retained in order to allow the 
construction of a project of special merit has increased.  Compare what was required of 
the developer in a 1988 case, In re Clover F Street Associates (“Clover F Street”),131  
with a similar special merit proposal decided by the Mayor’s Agent in 2002, In re The 
                                                                                                                                                             
126 See e.g., In re Archdiocese of Washington, HPA Nos. 99-219–99-222, 99-224–99-226 & 99-285 (Nov. 9, 1999) (“St. 
Patrick’s I”); In re Application for Demolition of the Webster School and for New Construction, HPA No. 00-462 (Feb. 15, 
2001). 
127 In re Application for Demolition of the Webster School and for New Construction, HPA No. 00-462 (Feb. 15, 2001). 
128 See id. at 13. 
129 See In re JBG Real Estate Associates  at 10. 
130 See, e.g., In re Calvary Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601 & 01-044 (Apr. 20, 2001); In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, 
Inc., HPA Nos. 00-332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000); 
131 In re Clover F Street Associates, L.P., HPA Nos. 88-490–88-493 (1988?). 
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John Akridge Companies and the Archdiocese of Washington (“St. Patrick’s II”).132  In 
Clover F Street, the developers proposed to demolish three contributing structures on F 
Street in one of the most important commercial frontages of the Downtown Historic 
District.  These structures included the Atlantic Building, an individual landmark on the 
D.C. Inventory of Historic Sites.  At one point in history, the Atlantic Building was the 
tallest building in the District of Columbia, and was one of the first buildings in the 
nation to employ “the emerging technology of skyscraper construction.”133  The Atlantic 
Building stood as the harbinger “of an unrealized skyline on F Street,” and a symbol of 
the New York or Chicago that Washington, D.C. might have become.134  However, the 
structures had major building code and fire protection deficiencies, and the developer 
wished to replace them with a nine-story office and retail structure, with a museum area 
on the ground floor.  Largely on a balancing test, the Mayor’s Agent approved their 
demolition, and required only archival documentation of the structures and the retention 
of their façades (a few bricks thick).135  Almost fifteen years later, a proposal advanced 
by the Archdiocese to demolish the only remaining low-scale commercial structures 
(which were approximately 60 to 80 feet deep) in the Downtown Historic District, and 
replace them with a mixed-use office building, was denied initially by the Mayor’s 
Agent.136  The application was rejected in part because the applicant proposed to 
demolish all but the façades of these structures.137  However, when the applicant revised 
its proposal to provide that not only would the façades be restored, but that between 
                                                 
132 In re The John Akridge Companies and the Archdiocese of Washington, HPA No. 01-219–224 & 01-208–01-209 (Aug. 1, 
2001) (“St. Patrick’s II”). 
133 See In re Clover F Street at 2-3. 
134 See id. at 11. 
135 Although the replacement development project remains incomplete to this day, the historic structures, except for their façades, 
have been demolished.  For a period of at least one year, the author of this article walked past the remains of the Atlantic 
Building every day on her way to law school, remarking only that the bare sheet of brick with a gaping hole of debris behind it 
looked fragile, unaware of the building’s significance.  The façades alone do not convey adequately the buildings’ history.   
136 In re Archdiocese of Washington, HPA Nos. 99-219–99-222, 99-224–99-226 & 99-285 (Nov. 9, 1999) (“St. Patrick’s I”).  
Coincidentally, these structures were located on the same block of F Street as the Atlantic Building. 
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twenty (20) and fifty (50) feet of the depth of each structure would be retained (in order 
to preserve the buildings’ unique features of scale), the Mayor’s Agent allowed their 
partial demolition to construct a project of special merit.138  This shift might reflect a 
recognition that although the past may have treated façade preservation as a sufficiently 
“specific feature” of land planning, its ubiquity over time rendered it not so “special” 
after all, forcing developers to become more creative in the preservation elements of a 
proposed special merit project.  
 
3. Special Merit:  By Virtue of Social or Other Benefits Having a High 
Priority for Community Services 
 
Three general themes emerged from Mayor’s Agent decisions approving special 
merit projects because of their social or other benefits having a high priority for 
community services.  First, projects that dedicated at least some of their space for “arts 
uses” were lavished with praise.  Often the proposed arts use was cited as the “benefit” 
which distinguished the project as one of special merit.139  For example, the D.C. 
Preservation League had initially opposed a proposed demolition of six contributing 
structures in the Pennsylvania Avenue Historic District, which were slated to be replaced 
by a 343,000 gross square foot office building (with 210,000 square feet allotted for 
leaseable office space, and 21,000 square feet planned for retail uses).140  However, when 
the applicant modified its proposal to include the provision of 2,400 square feet of street 
level space to be dedicated to local arts presentation and exhibition, the League withdrew 
                                                                                                                                                             
137 Presumably in an attempt to compensate for the loss of the low scale of these historic buildings, the applicant proposed to set 
back its office building 20 feet behind the retained façades.  See id. at 4. 
138 See In re The John Akridge Companies and the Archdiocese of Washington, HPA No. 01-219–224 & 01-208–01-209 (Aug. 1, 
2001) (“St. Patrick’s II”). 
139 See, e.g., In re 507-525 11th Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 94-157–94-175 (Jul. 28, 1994); In re Square 456, Old Hecht Company 
Dept. Store Complex, HPA Nos. 95-440–95-448 (Sept. 11, 1996); In re JBG Real Estate Associates XXIII, Inc., HPA Nos. 00-
332–00-334 (Sept. 12, 2000); In re Clover F Street Associates, L.P., HPA Nos. 88-490–88-493 (1988?); cf. In re Archdiocese of 
Washington, HPA Nos. 99-219–99-222, 99-224–99-226 & 99-285 (Nov. 9, 1999) (“St. Patrick’s I”) (although one half of the 
first floor of the proposed office building would be dedicated to arts space, it did not exceed zoning requirements and, 
additionally, would dislocate a 104-seat theater; project was not found to be one of special merit).  
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its opposition, and the Mayor’s Agent upheld the project largely on the basis of this 
“benefit”.  As a matter of law, the Mayor’s Agent heralded the arts exhibition area as a 
quality that would make the proposed office building “a notable contribution” and which 
would renew the “cultural life of the downtown.”141      
 Economic revitalization and renewal were often held to constitute benefits that 
catapulted proposed projects into the special merit category. 142  This was true in the case 
of the Tivoli Theatre, a structure listed as a landmark on the D.C. Inventory of Historic 
Sites.143  The District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development 
(“DHCD”) applied for a permit to partially demolish the theater to provide for a state-of-
the-art supermarket, parking lot, and other commercial and retail uses.  The site had been 
identified by the District’s 14th Street Urban Renewal Plan as an area that had not 
recovered from civil disturbances of 1968 and which was in need of investment.144   The 
Mayor’s Agent agreed, finding that partial demolition of the Tivoli Theatre was justified 
by the employment and economic growth promised by the project (a Safeway Grocery 
store that would create 35 full-time and 55 part-time jobs, and other commercial/retail 
uses within the Tivoli structure) qualified as benefits having a high priority for 
community service.145   
 Finally, if a proposed project can be reasonably linked to a reduction in human 
death, there is strong precedent supporting the proposition that such a project will be 
                                                                                                                                                             
140 See In re Applications to Raze Certain Squares on 9th Street, N.W., and E Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 86-302–86-305, 86-311, 
86-491 (Dec. 15, 1986) (“Quadrangle”). 
141 See In re Quadrangle at 9. 
142 See, e.g., In re Application for Demolition and New Construction Located at 601 13th Street, N.W., Square 289, Lot 48, HPA 
No. 83-478 (June 29, 1984) (“Homer Building”); In re Application for Demolition, Alteration, and New Construction in Square 
345 Bounded by G, H, 10th, and 11th Streets, N.W., HPA No. 84-448 (Jan. 14, 1985) (“ Palais Royal”); In re Application for 
Partial Demolition Permits for Buildings Located at 810-820 7th Street, N.W., HPA Nos. 88-825 & 88-826 (Mar. 1, 1989) 
(“King’s Palace”); In re Lots 911 & 829, Square 5770, 1901, 1909, 1911 & 1913, Martin Luther King, Jr., Ave., S.E., HPA Nos. 
98-116, 98-117, 98-119 & 98-121 (Jul. 1, 1998) (“Anacostia Gateway”). 
143 See In re Tivoli Theatre, 14th Street & Park Road, N.W., Square 2837, Parcel 29 in the 14th St. Urban Renewal Plan, HPA No. 
88-258 (May 14, 1992). 
144 See In re Tivoli Theatre at 6-7. 
145 The Mayor’s Agent seemed persuaded by testimony that these benefits would also “create a sense of confidence in the area 
that will, in turn, encourage future investment and development in the 14th Street Corridor.”  In re Tivoli Theatre, at 7.   
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considered one of special merit on “benefits” grounds.  In re Duke Ellington Bridge 
considered whether “suicide barriers” could be retained on the Duke Ellington Bridge, 
which was listed as a landmark on the D.C. Inventory of Historic Sites since 1973.146  
The Mayor’s Agent found that, although the eight foot high barriers were a significant 
intrusion into the architectural integrity of the bridge, sufficient evidence—including the 
notoriety of the Duke Ellington Bridge as a major public safety problem because of the 
high number of completed suicides off the bridge, coupled with dangers presented to 
pedestrians and drivers on the Rock Creek Parkway below the bridge—was presented to 
justify their retention as a project of special merit.   
  
IV. Conclusion: Observations for the Future of Special Merit 
 
 Carol Rose, an intellectual giant in modern preservation law, has written that procedural 
opportunity is one of the most important contributions of historic preservation.  Preservation law 
can afford opportunities for “community influence” because a neighborhood is “especially able 
to assess the worth of its own streets and structures,” and the dialogue generated through that 
process “can strengthen the neighborhood, encourage self-definition, and give leverage with the 
larger community.”147  Yet advocacy for a community may become stymied when the 
community’s voice is subject to a mandatory procedure that has been characterized, more or less, 
by imprecise application of standards alleged to govern the process.  
  To lend more precision, predictability and clarity to the historic preservation permitting 
process where claims of “special merit” are asserted, the Mayor’s Agent may be wise to consider 
incorporating a small layer of bureaucracy into the process: have applicants fill out a “special 
merit form.”  Such a form, quite simply, would require applicants to state with precision the 
                                                 
146 See In re Application of District of Columbia Department of Public Works, HPA No. 87-377 (Aug. 20, 1987) (“Duke 
Ellington Memorial Bridge”). 
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grounds upon which their case for the Mayor’s Agent is based.  For example, are they alleging 
that their project has specific features of land planning that rise to the level of special merit?  
Fine, so long as their “land planning” arguments are stated separately from any arguments 
discussing why their project also might have “social or other benefits having a high priority for 
community services” that also meet the special merit standard.  The form could then be used as a 
guide for the Mayor’s Agent when crafting the opinions.  This, in turn, might lead to greater 
precision and an enhanced understanding of the precise parameters of special merit.  A proposed 
form that might serve such purposes is attached to this article as Appendix Two. 
 Also along the lines of lending predictability and clarity to the issue of special merit, the 
Mayor’s Agent would be wise to apply consistently the “necessary” test.  This also would help 
the Mayor’s Agent determine with certainty that demolition of an historic structure really is the 
only “reasonable” option for development.  I suggest the imposition of a “Baby-NEPA” process: 
just as all federal government agencies are required to assess formally the environmental impacts 
of their major proposals, so should applicants who are contemplating the destruction of a symbol 
of a community’s history be required to assess their project’s “historical” impacts, and consider 
reasonable alternatives that might be more “historically-friendly”.  As discussed earlier in this 
article,148 applicants should be required to submit to the Historic Preservation Review Board (for 
ultimate consideration by the Mayor’s Agent) detailed evidence concerning the alternatives to 
demolition they considered, and opponents of a proposed “special merit” demolition project also 
should be afforded the opportunity to suggest reasonable alternatives for the Mayor’s 
consideration. 
Finally, and this is a small but important suggestion, the Mayor’s Agent should make 
archival quality photographic or other substantive documentation a required element of any 
                                                                                                                                                             
147 Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 534 
(1981). 
148 See infra pp. 21-24.  
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demolition project that is approved on grounds of special merit, in order to clarify that such 
documentation in and of itself cannot be the basis for a special merit finding.  
Perhaps the implementation of these suggestions will help the community to become 
better informed as to what is contemplated by a “special merit” inquiry.  Special merit cuts 
deeply into core issues of historic preservation to which there are no easy solutions.  What 
elements of the past should be preserved, and when should other interests of a community—
environmental, social or economic—trump the concerns of historic preservation?  The past 20 
years of special merit application in the District of Columbia suggest that the answer to these 
questions will always be “it depends.”  Thus, to the extent that better procedures or more 
consistent reasoning can be utilized in special merit decisions, the greater the chances that such 
decisions will be better informed and best for the community.  Information about the special 
merit process, and insight as to what one should reasonably expect if seeking a permit on such 
grounds, may be the highest goal to which we can hope to aspire.   
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APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX ONE:  CHART OF D.C. HISTORIC PRESERVATION STATUTE  
 
 
Conditions Under Which Demolition Permits in Historic Districts/on Historic Landmarks  
May be Permitted under the D.C. Historic Preservation Act 
     
                
I. Application to Demolish, Alter, or Subdivide Structure within Historic District OR to Demolish, Alter, or 
Subdivide Structure on site of Historic Landmark     
               
    
II. To Grant, Mayor must find:  
 
A.  Project is Necessary in the Public Interest  
 
Which means: 
 
1. Necessary in the public interest because it is consistent with the Act 
 
Which means: 
 
1.   With respect to properties in historic districts: 
(A)   Retain AND enhance the character of the historic district and encourage 
the historic structures’ adaptation for current use; 
(B)   Assure that alterations and subdivisions are compatible with district’s 
historic character 
                      
  
2.   With respect to historic landmarks: 
(A)   Retain AND enhance historic landmarks and encourage their adaptation 
for current use; 
(B)   To encourage restoration of historic landmarks.   
 
 
     OR 
 
 
2. Necessary to construct a project of “special merit” 
  
 Which means: 
 
1.  Exemplary Architecture; OR 
 
2.  Special features of land planning; OR 
 
3.  Social or other benefits having high priority for community services. 
 
 
B. To deny project would amount to Unreasonable Economic Hardship 
 
Which means: 
 
1.   Would amount to a taking without just compensation; OR 
 
 2 
2.   In the case of a low income owner (as determined by the Mayor), denial would place an 
onerous and excessive financial burden upon the owner.  
 3 
APPENDIX TWO: 
 
 
PROPOSED FORM TO ACCOMPANY SPECIAL MERIT HEARINGS 
BEFORE THE MAYOR’S AGENT 
 4 
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 
614 H STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D.C.  20001 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING BEFORE  
MAYOR’S AGENT FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION: 
 
SEEKING/OPPOSING PERMIT ON SPECIAL MERIT GROUNDS 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
CASE NAME 
 
Application for Permit to Demolish: 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
HPA No.  
 
TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF/ 
TESTIMONY IN OPPOSTION TO  
 
APPLICATION FOR PERMIT TO DEMOLISH: 
 
 
 
 
1. Please attach evidence of alternatives to the proposed demolition, listing each proposal 
separately.  Include information such as who proposed it, the process through which it was 
considered, the approximate period of time over which it was considered, and reasons why it 
was rejected. 
 
2. Did the Historic Preservation Review Board find this project to be “necessary”? 
 
Yes   No  
 
 
3. Do you contend that your project is Consistent with the Purposes of the Act? 
Please check only one below.   
 
 Yes   No  
 
4. Do you contend that your project is one of Special Merit? 
Please check only one below.  Note, if you checked “yes” in question two above, and check “yes” 
below, you must state your reasons as to why this project is one of special merit separately from your 
reasons as to why it might be consistent with the Act.    
 
 Yes   No  
 
5. On which grounds do you contend the project is one of Special Merit? 
Note, while you are free to present evidence that your project satisfies more than one special merit 
criterion, evidence supporting each prong must be listed separately. 
 
 a. Exemplary Architecture___________   
 b. Specific Features of Land Planning___________ 
c. Having Social or Other Benefits with a High Priority for Community Services___________  
